

November
1985

MEETINGS & CONVENTIONS

THE SECURITY ISSUE

How to Protect Your VIPs

- Espionage at Technical Meetings
- Airport Security Update

**Cut Hotel Costs:
10 Key Areas
to Negotiate**

**Tipping:
Who, When
& How Much**

**Avoid
Convention Center
Mistakes**

MEETINGS & CONVENTIONS

November 1985

COVER STORY

Henry J. Kissinger, flanked by Chairman Gerald Mandell and Senior VP Robert M. Mulligan of the New York Food Merchants Association, after speaking at the Association's recent conference at the Concord Hotel in Kiamesha Lake, NY. Mr. Kissinger travels with his own bodyguards.

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
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EDITOR'S PODIUM



Bombs for Breakfast

Over your morning coffee you read about a car bomb going off in a Beirut street, or about the daughter of a Central American president being kidnapped, or about the Russians filching some technical information from us, and you lean back complacently, saying to yourself, "Thank goodness all of that has nothing to do with me."

If you're lucky, it hasn't.

But you may not be lucky forever.

And that is why *M&C* has devoted a major part of its feature section to many of the problems related to terrorism and espionage and to the security necessary to protect lives, documents and the orderly conduct of meetings.

That last may seem ridiculously unimportant when compared with lives, but for you, the meeting planner, it may mean the difference between a career or walking the streets. Did you know, for example, that many of our scientific and professional meetings already have drawn the attention of the FBI and the Pentagon? And that strict rules have been established to bar otherwise eligible delegates who might—just might—be security risks? If so, read "Big Brother is Watching." It is an eye-opener.

And did you know that when celebrities—even non-political ones—appear on your program, they may come complete with security guards and a rigorous blueprint of logistical requirements? This may affect destination and hotel choices. It surely will affect selection of the room in which the function will be held and the route the celebrity will take to get there. If you don't know how to handle these complications, the plus value of having a high-profile figure may sink to the negative when he's half an hour late on the podium or never reaches it at all.


Your own CEO may need the kind of protection—especially at an overseas meeting—that would have gotten you accused of paranoia 20 years ago. And not all security problems involve threats to life and limb. You may sometime need to take steps to ward off demonstrators at a meeting.

In other words, your job as a meeting planner shortly may encompass more than logistics and agenda. And your training in details makes you—perhaps uniquely in your organization among all organization personnel—the person most fitted to cope. And should the time come when you are called to use your skills to handle the security side of planning a meeting, and should you do your job well, your prestige within the organization, and your career, will enjoy the benefits.

That is one of the more important reasons *M&C* tackles these subjects. Read about them.

Mel Hosansky, Editor-in-Chief and Associate Publisher

FIFTH ANNUAL SCIENTIFIC SYMPOSIUM



FEATURE

BIG BROTHER IS WATCHING

SCIENTIFIC/ENGINEERING ASSOCIATIONS UP IN ARMS OVER GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO STEM FLOW OF TECHNICAL DATA

by Richard Hartzman

About a week before the 1983 annual meeting of the American Vacuum Society, a man came to the New York offices of the association and identified himself as an FBI agent. He said, "We hope to catch a spy" and asked for complimentary badges to allow six agents to attend the conference under assumed names.

This was not the first time the American Vacuum Society, a forum for those concerned with the practical applications of vacuum physics, had experienced an incursion made by federal agents in the interests of national security. In consequence, AVS President John Arthur responded angrily. He called the FBI and said that the meeting was "open" and that anybody—an FBI agent included—could attend if he paid the fee. Later, a man with bureau ID approached Arthur, pulled out a roll of \$100 bills and paid \$780 to register himself and five colleagues.

Early in the conference, Alfred Zehe, an East German physicist, was arrested and charged with espionage.

Meanwhile, Arthur and others said the agents had made themselves conspicuous by wearing bulky, old-fashioned earphones. In addition, AVS officials apparently believed their phones were tapped.

In the November 25, 1983, issue of *Science* magazine, it was reported that the wife of an AVS officer making a call from her room got not an operator but the tape of a previous conversation. And, while a spokesperson for the hotel said there was "no evidence" of wiretapping, Arthur countered that, after the incident, hotel management advised him not to use the phone in his room for confidential conversations.

Finally, after the arrest, the FBI de-

manded, under threat of subpoena, that the AVS turn over a list of attendees to the meeting.

This incident is not typical. Rarely are spies actually apprehended at scientific gatherings. Moreover, in this case, the Feds apparently were not present only in their role as guardians of U.S. technology. (Reports of the arrest noted that it coincided with congressional hearings on scientific communications and national security.)

It is, however, a story that dramatizes the fact that spies *do* regularly attend U.S. scientific conferences. It points up how serious the government is about the leaking of scientific and technical information, and it shows that government agents *do* intervene at scientific symposia. And, in its somewhat bizarre details, it illustrates the paranoia, confusion and ill will that often surround collisions between scientists and governments. ▶



Alfred Zehe, East German physicist and accused spy, is led to arraignment by FBI agents. Zehe was arrested at a Boston scientific conference in 1983.

Illustration by Tommy Sdoski

BIG BROTHER

Sturm und Drang

This is the stuff of controversy, and right now, the debate is raging fiercely.

Government officials, speaking of "technology hemorrhaging," have moved increasingly toward a policy of restricting the free flow of unclassified technical information. The information in question is not secret, but the Pentagon does consider it militarily sensitive. It involves such so-called "dual-use technologies" as lasers, microelectronics, computers and optics.

The scientific and engineering communities, which include numerous societies that hold thousands of technical conferences every year, have responded with alarm. They accuse the government of hyperanxiety and argue that the free flow of ideas is basic to scientific and technological advance. They maintain that if something is really secret, it should be classified. They scoff at the government's manifest concern about giving away manufacturing secrets. American industry, they say, is not about to give away "the family jewels."

Of particular concern at the moment is an informal proposal put forward by the Department of Defense. Its adoption would, in effect, turn the organizers of scientific/technical meetings into policemen, making them responsible for setting up extra, limited-access sessions and putting them under legal obligation to control the access.

On this issue, John Vossen, a former president of the American Vacuum Society, told *M&C*, "Scientific and engineering societies cannot be put into the position of guarding the gates of the country. Societies cannot be cops or censors; they cannot control what people say at a meeting; they cannot control who is allowed in."

Chapter I: In the beginning

The present era of tension between the scientific/engineering community and the government began in 1980, during the Carter administration. It was born during the same period in which the U.S. pulled out of the Moscow Olympics and the government eliminated direct air service to Russia on the heels of the Soviet-backed counter insurgency in Afghanistan.

The first target of the administra-

tion's new "get-tough" policy was a small meeting sponsored by the American Vacuum Society. Its subject was the bubble memory, a species of computer hardware not usually thought to have military significance.

The incident began when a CIA agent presented himself at the society's offices and asked for a copy of the meeting program. Then, only five days before the conference, Vossen, who then was AVS president, received a call from the conference organizers. They told him that the Commerce Department had ordered them to "disinvite" the registered attendees from the U.S.S.R., East Europe and China and to have other foreign delegates sign a pledge not to pass on information garnered at the conference to Eastern Bloc



"Scientific and engineering societies cannot be put in the position of guarding the gates of the country . . . At meetings, they cannot control what people say . . . or who gets in."

—John Vossen

Past President, American Vacuum Society

nationals—colleagues included.

Commerce administers the law under which technical data may be denied to potential adversaries. The responsible official told AVS that the bubble memory conference was covered by the Export Administration Regulations. He warned Vossen that non-compliance could get him a fine of \$10,000 and ten years in jail—plus a penalty of up to \$100,000 for the society.

Cables were dispatched disinventing nine scheduled attendees.

As it happened, however, the three Chinese delegates were already in transit. Upon arrival in Santa Barbara, they were packed off on a spouse trip to an artists' colony. On the whole, they were amicable about it; they did, however, remark that it wasn't the Chinese who invaded Afghanistan.

Then the State Department got into the act. It did not want the Chinese disinvented, and after some backing-and-forthing, they were allowed to attend sessions—after signing an agreement that pledged them not to reveal any information they might garner to the nationals of Eastern Bloc countries. The conference was monitored by an FBI agent.

In the May 9, 1980, issue of *Science* Vossen was quoted as describing the train of events as an "unprecedented, frivolous and foolish exercise of ham-handed bureaucratic power."

That same month, the State Department denied visas to eight Soviet scientists hoping to attend a laser fusion conference sponsored by the Optical Society of America and the Institute for Electrical and Electronic Engineers. A ninth Soviet scientist already in the country was denied permission to travel to San Diego for the meeting.

Although these incidents seemed singular at the time, voices were raised in concern. In particular, Vossen, quoted in the April 1980 issue of *Physics Today*, said, "With the number of items on the embargoed list [Commerce's Commodity Control List], many technical societies probably will disappear."

Chapter II: Enter Reagan (stage right)

The new Reagan administration brought with it heightened concern about information leakage to Eastern

Bloc countries. In a classified report quoted in the April 2, 1983, issue of *Science News*, intelligence and defense officials warned of a "clear trend toward greater Soviet efforts" to obtain information through "vacuum cleaning" university research and open meetings.

In response, four university presidents wrote to the Secretaries of State, Commerce and Defense, warning, in part: "Restricting the free flow of information among scientists and engineers would alter fundamentally the system that produced the scientific and technological lead that government is now trying to protect and leave us with nothing to protect in the very near future."

But the government continued its

policy of restricting attendance at scientific conferences. It also moved toward broader interpretation of the regulations governing information export and stepped up demands for research-contract clauses restricting the dissemination of research results.

In January 1982, Admiral Bobby Inman of the CIA, in an address to the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, warned of the urgency of finding solutions to the problem of information leakage. Should "significant harm" occur, he said, it "could well prompt the government to overreact."

Chapter III: Big Brother with a vengeance

In August 1982, just before the sched-

uled release of a heralded National Academy of Science report on the impact of national security measures on the conduct of unclassified research, the Pentagon took an unprecedented tack.

Four days before the start of the 26th Annual International Symposium of the Society of Photo-Optical Instrumentation Engineers (SPIE), a conference that drew 2,700 persons from 30 countries (four from the Soviet Union), Lt. Col. Gary Walters of the DOD called SPIE President Richard Wollensack. Expressing concern that Eastern Bloc representatives would have access to "sensitive" papers, he asked for space at the meeting site.

When Wollensack arrived at the conference, he found DOD officials hard at

In September, the heads of 12 powerful societies wrote Defense Secretary Weinberger protesting controls on unclassified data.

These controls have resulted in disruption of technical conferences and conference planning and have forced the introduction of a new category of technical session, one that is unclassified but with limited access. The current broad range of information subject to such controls places important limits on the exchange of scientific and technical information which, in turn, are detrimental to the national security interests of the nation.

We believe it is in our mutual best interest to minimize the amount of unclassified information that is subject to these controls and to define practices which facilitate, rather than restrict, the open exchange of scientific and engineering research. We have already been discussing these matters with representatives of your Department. However, we believe that your personal support for these objectives will be needed to achieve the desired changes in policy and in direction. We will be pleased to work with you to define measures that will achieve this goal.

Our objective is to ensure that science and technology continue to play their vital role in support of national security and other national goals. We trust that you understand the serious nature of our joint concerns.

Signed:

Jam Y Oldshue
President

American Association of Engineering Societies

J. S. [Signature]
President

American Association for the Advancement of Science

Charles A. Eldon
President

Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers

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National Society of Professional Engineers

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September 17, 1985
The Honorable Caspar Weinberger
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. Weinberger:

The undersigned leaders of scientific and engineering societies believe it is important to bring to your attention our shared concerns regarding new controls being applied by the Department of Defense to unclassified technical information. These controls have resulted in disruption of a new category of technical session, one that is unclassified but with limited access. The current broad range of information subject to such controls places important limits on the exchange of scientific and technical information which, in turn, are detrimental to the national security interests of the nation.

In science and in engineering research, the open exchange of information ensures that critical peer review is applied to new advances, provides valuable cross-fertilization of ideas and helps avoid duplication of effort. One of the principal missions of our organizations is to encourage and provide opportunities for such exchange and thereby to promote advances in the fields of knowledge which we represent. Since such advances are also important to national security, we feel impelled to advise you of the counterproductive consequences of the current DoD policies and of the limitations in our ability to respond to them.

New controls being applied to certain unclassified information by the Department of Defense have the effect of placing such information de facto into a new category of classification. Responsibility for implementing controls for such information must lie with the government, and not with our organizations. Therefore our organizations will not be responsible for, nor will they sponsor, closed or restricted access technical sessions at meetings or conferences conducted under their auspices.

work summoning the authors of individual papers. To compound the paranoia, the Commerce Department had sent a midnight telegram warning SPIE officials to comply with the regulations controlling technology export. State Department officials, on the lookout for "international incidents," were prowling the premises.

The Commerce Department then decided that the conference satisfied its criteria for an open meeting and ruled that anyone could attend and that all the papers could be published.

But DOD stayed on course. DOD officials, *who did not have the authority to clear papers*, had two questions for conference participants: "Was your work sponsored by a DOD agency?" and "Have you secured clearance?"

According to *Science News*, this tactic achieved its desired effect. "They never asked me to withdraw my two presentations," said an engineer from the private sector, "but I was scared enough to pull both of them."

As many of those presenting papers were either DOD employees or working under DOD contracts, some 150 unclassified papers out of a total of 700 were withdrawn. The conference was left in disarray. After looking at a list of cancelled papers, a British scientist expressed a typical reaction: "I came 6,000 miles for this?"

A number of participants asked for refunds, and some, fearful that SPIE was on a Pentagon hit list, dropped their memberships.

Chapter IV: The gathering gloom

The aforementioned NAS report, which came out in the aftermath of the SPIE conference, concluded that, while technology leakage through legal and illegal equipment sales is "substantial and serious," open scientific communication at meetings "has been of little consequence to U.S. security . . ." The report also found fault with the way data from scientific papers presented at public meetings was assessed by the government. It recommended no limitations on the communication of unclassified information unless it had clear military implications.

Despite a favorable response to the NAS findings by top administration officials, government agents continued to

demand that papers be withdrawn from conferences and to order restrictions.

Moreover, Congress strengthened the hand of the DOD by including in the 1984 Defense Authorization Act a provision that gives the Pentagon the authority to "withhold from public disclosure" any technical data in its purview that cannot legally be exported without authorization.

The year 1984 also marked the beginning of a new trend: the self-censoring of meetings sponsored by scientific and engineering societies. Conference organizers began to partially or totally exclude non-U.S. citizens

1984 also marked . . . the self-censoring of meetings sponsored by scientific and engineering societies.

from certain meetings.

At the same time, many societies were becoming concerned about the "chilling effect" of the various restrictive practices. Fewer scientific papers were being submitted for presentation at conferences.

The societies also were starting to worry about discrimination against their foreign members—not without cause:

- A group of NATO parliamentarians petitioned various European governments to consider a coordinated political response to controls placed on the flow of technological information.
- A legislative body of the European Economic Community adopted a resolution blaming U.S. "no-foreigner" meetings on a "growing nationalism surrounding technology, whereby the U.S.A. hopes to achieve economic and technological supremacy."

Chapter V: The other shoe

In response to these developments, the DOD recently has accused societies of overreacting. In a letter to Richard Gowen, former president of the Institute for Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE), Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger said: "Some professional societies have attempted to

address this issue by adopting 'U.S. only' conference policies. DOD does not support this approach because it fails to recognize our national obligation to work with our allies toward mutual attainment of national security."

Weinberger encouraged IEEE officials to "become direct participants in improving cooperative policies and procedures that will allow interchange of technical information with clear recognition of the national security implications involved . . ."

Chapter VI: A negotiated settlement

Last April, while 35 representatives of various groups were meeting to discuss what steps, if any, to take in response to Pentagon policies, the DOD launched another initiative.

The target was again an SPIE symposium. Two weeks before its start, the department told SPIE officials that 43 of the 219 scheduled papers could not be presented in open session. Many on the hit list dealt with lasers and could apply to "Star Wars" research. Thirteen were said to contain classified information, and the remainder, though unclassified, were deemed militarily sensitive. Their authors had failed to follow DOD procedures for clearing their papers.

Normally, many of the "sensitive" papers could have been presented at a parallel classified meeting publicized by SPIE but not an official part of the symposium. However, due to improper organizing, the classified meeting fell apart; there was no forum for the unapproved papers.

Contemplating a disaster comparable to the 1982 fiasco, conference organizers appealed to the Defense Department and, through negotiations, worked out an arrangement under which 28 of the papers were presented at special "export controlled" sessions with limited access. DOD officials were on hand to ensure that the participants were screened and that they signed an "export-controlled" form.

The conference was salvaged, but the scientific/technical community was again distressed. Lewis Larmore, 1985 president of SPIE, summed up his organization's sentiments in an interview for the April 26, 1985, issue of *Science*.

continued on page 111

BIG BROTHER

continued from page 48

"All of us agreed," he said, "that if we are going to stay in business, we are going to have to kowtow to these rules. We've lost our virginity."

Chapter VII: Not so fast

Initially, the Defense Department took the position that, although the above arrangement worked well in a panic situation, it was not necessarily a model for the future. More recently, however, it has circulated informally a proposal that would encourage scientific and engineering societies to hold limited ac-

The societies also were starting to worry about discrimination against foreign members.

cess sessions along the lines of those worked out for the SPIE meeting.

The proposed procedures would apply only to presentations by DOD employees or those with active agreements with the department. Under the tentative plan, unclassified papers would be submitted for review by the DOD. Export-controlled technical data would be marked, and the author and conference organizer would be given a choice. They could: 1) delete the sensitive material and present the paper in open session; 2) present the original version in a DOD-controlled, classified session, or 3) present the original in a limited-access, export-controlled session. Attendance at limited-access sessions would be circumscribed in the same way it was at the SPIE conference, and attendees would be required to sign an Export-Controlled DOD Technical Data Agreement, DOD Form 2345.

Under this proposal, conference organizers would have to play cop. Except in special cases, where the DOD might assume responsibility. *They would be responsible for checking an attendee's right to be at a session and for keeping unauthorized participants out.*

As for the publication of export-controlled papers by the conference

sponsor, it would be allowed if distribution were limited to those who were eligible to attend the oral session and had signed the DOD agreement.

Predictably, the scientific/technical community is unhappy about the tentative proposal. Even though the plan is likely to be revised before it is formally put forward, it already has drawn considerable fire.

In fact, the presidents of 12 important societies—organizations that, after all, survive largely on the work of volunteers—have written Defense Secretary Weinberger saying, in part: "Our organizations *will not be responsible for, nor will they sponsor, closed or restricted access technical sessions at meetings or conferences conducted under their auspices.*" □

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